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This article aims to answer questions related to which model is more adequate to 
describe the Romanian household’s behavior. There are two types of models, which are 
used whenever one attempts to model household allocation decision: the common utility 
model and the collective model. In this paper we test both the implications of the 
common utility model and the implications of the collective model using Romanian 
household data. The results are very strong. The common utility model fails to describe 
accurately the household’s behavior, while the restrictions that the collective model 
imposes on the demand functions are supported by the Romanian household data. 
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The question of how to model household behavior has received much attention lately. 
There are two approaches to this problem. The first one draws on the individual utility 
model, and generalizes it to households by assuming that they are characterized by a 
common utility function. This approach is attractive especially due to its simplicity and 
the demands it puts on the data set; it requires information aggregated at the 
household level, which is the way information was generally collected. Unfortunately, it 
can lead to misleading results, especially in cases when who gets what in terms of 
income is influencing the household consumption decision.  
Recently, there has been extensive work devoted to models that take the individuality 
of households into consideration. These classes of models are closer to reality, but 
more difficult to compute and test and require information, at least about income, 
disaggregated at the individual rather than household level. In this case, each 
household is characterized by a utility function, and within the household a decision of 
what to consume is achieved. In cases when one of the household members is a 
dictator, the two models yield similar results. If the allocation is efficient, and the 
individual members’ utility function is egotistic, as defined by Becker, it is possible to 
separate the household allocation process into two stages. In the first stage, 
household members decide on an income sharing rule, in other words, they establish 
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a method of dividing the household total income among themselves. In the second 
stage, each household member decides how to allocate his/her income share to 
different consumption goods, such as to observe the budget constraint determined in 
the first stage. For a more detailed discussion of the two types of models see 
Browning et al. (1993).  
In this article, we verify which type of model is empirically supported by the Romanian 
household data by testing first whether the implications of the common utility model 
are supported by data or not. Second, we test whether the restrictions that the 
collective model imposes on the demand functions are valid or not in the context of 
Romanian couples of pensioners. The test used here is a modified version of the test 
derived by Browning et al. (1993). 
Models of household behavior 
The common utility model is an extension of the utility concept to households as a 
whole. The household is characterized by a utility function U(C, L1, L2), which depends 
on total family consumption C, and on the leisure time of each family member. The 
household maximizes the above utility function under the budget constraint defined by 
individual earnings together with the household’s non-labor income. The solutions to 
the maximization problem have the following form: 
  C = C(p,Z, Y,)  (1) 
 L i = Li(p, Z, Y,) for i=1,2.  (2) 
where: p is a vector of prices including wage rates, Z is a vector of demographic 
variables and Y is the total income. 
The most important criticism of the common utility model arises from the functional 
form of the utility function, which depends only on the aggregate consumption, and not 
on how the consumption is divided across the household members. If all goods were 
public goods
2, the intra-household consumption allocation would not matter in welfare 
terms. However, there are a limited number of goods that can be considered public 
goods (heating, electricity, education, etc.). The insensitivity of the utility with respect 
to individual consumption means that the repartition of the total consumption between 
household members does not matter. The utility level is the same if consumption is 
split evenly between the two members, or if one member’s consumption is C and the 
other one’s is zero.  
In the collective model each household member is characterized by a utility function. 
Depending on the functional form of the utility function, members can have the same 
preferences
3, “caring” preferences
4, or “egotistic” preferences
5. The functional form of 
the demand functions are now of the following form: 
 C i = Ci(p, Y, Z, ym, yf) for i=1,2.  (3) 
                                                           
2 Public goods (at the household level) are goods that can be enjoyed by more persons at the 
same time. Examples of public goods are heating, electricity, etc. 
3 The functional form of the utility function in the situation of the same preference case is the 
following: U
i = F(C, L
1, L
2). This case corresponds to the common utility model. 
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 L i = Li(p, Y, Z, ym, yf) for i=1,2.  (4) 
where: ym, yf are the male and the female individual income, respectively. 
One important property of the collective model is that if allocations are efficient and 
the utility function is “egotistic”, then the allocation process can be viewed as a two-
stage process. In the first stage total household income is divided across household 
members, according to an income sharing rule, and in the second stage each 
individual is deciding his/her consumption bundle, by maximizing his/her utility function 
subject to the budget constraint derived in the first stage. 
The differences between equation (1) versus (3) and (2) versus (4) rest with the 
determining variables. In comparison to expression (1) and (2), in the equation (3) and 
(4) there also are individual income variables. This difference in the functional form of 
the demand equations in the two cases is the basis for the common utility model test 
known in the literature under the name of “income pooling test”. This test consists in 
checking whether the coefficients of the individual income are simultaneously equal to 
zero in the individual demand equations. The failure to reject the equality to zero of 
individual income can be interpreted as a rejection of the common utility model. 
Unfortunately, the rejection is not enough in the sense that it gives no clue regarding 
an alternative model that is appropriate in case the common utility model fails to 
describe household behavior.  
The test of the collective model 
In order to test the collective model, one needs to derive the implications that it has 
over the demand functions. In the literature, the most common test used whenever 
data on prices are not available, as is the case for cross-section data, is the one 
derived in Browning et al. (1993). However, during the derivation of the test, the 
authors have used a somewhat unreasonable assumption. We will show that this 
assumption is not necessary to obtain testable restriction of the collective model. 
The derivation follows up to some point the steps from the Browning et al. paper. We 
consider household aggregate consumption as the summation of male and female 
consumption: 
 C i (ym, yf, Y)= Fim[Ym(ym, yf,Y)] + Fif[Yf(ym, yf, Y)]  (5) 
where: Fim, Fif is the male and the female consumption, respectively, of good i, Ym,Yf is 
the male and the female share, respectively, of total household income, derived in the 
first stage of the allocation process, ym, yf,  is the male and the female individual 
income, respectively, and Y is the household total income. 
In the absence of saving, the following identity holds: 
  Y = ym + yf + y0 = Ym + Yf  = µ(z)·Y +[1- µ(z)]·Y 
where:  y0 is the non-labor income of the household, which is income from rents, 
interest rate from deposits, dividends, etc, and µ(z) is the income sharing rule. 
We differentiate the above equation with respect to ym: 
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Here is where the difference between the Browning test and the current test lays. In 
the Browning article, the authors have computed the derivative of consumption with 
respect to the individual income considering that total household income is constant. 
Under this assumption, ∂Y/∂ym is equal to zero, so the first part of the second 
derivative vanishes. In order that the above be true, either the female individual 
income, or non-labor income must accommodate to the change, so that the total 
income remains constant. We considered this assumption not very realistic, so we 
dropped it, and showed how, even in this situation, a test for the collective model can 
be derived.  
Since  1
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A similar equation can be derived for the consumption derivative with respect to the 
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Subtracting from both equation (7) and equation (8) the expression (9) we obtain: 
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Looking at expression (12), one may be notice that while the left hand side of the 
equation is a function of the i good, the right hand side is not. Therefore, if we 
compute the same ratio of the difference of derivatives for all goods we obtain the  Forecasting the Romanian GDP 
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same quantity. This is the basis of the test for the collective model, which consists in 
checking whether the ratio of the difference of derivatives is equal across goods. If the 
null hypothesis can not be rejected, it is interpreted as proof that the collective model 
is good at describing household behavior.  
Checking the behavior of Romanian households 
The previous section introduced some simple tests for both models of household 
behavior. In this section we present the estimation of the demand system, the 
variables used for determining the allocation process, and some interesting results.  
The data used for testing household behavior came from the 2003 Household 
expenditure survey. The data contains information on all types of expenditure and 
income, together with information regarding individual characteristics of all household 
members, including human capital information. 
We will estimate simultaneously seven demand equations: demand for food, demand 
for non-food, demand for services, demand for utilities, demand for telecommunica-
tions, demand for transport, demand for adult goods. Although, the name of the group 
is self-explanatory, some groups need a little clarification. The food group contains 
food and beverages consumed at home, with the exception of spirits and tobacco 
which made up the adult goods group. Foods consumed in restaurants are included in 
the service group. The transport group contains all transport-related expenses, public 
transport, train/plane fair as well as all types of expenditure related to buying and 
owning a car. The estimation is performed on couples of pensioners in order to avoid 
the necessity to model the labor market decision, which is simultaneous to the 
consumption decision, and to limit the heterogeneity of the data. For the same reason, 
we have used the instrumental variable estimation for the total income variable, 
because it is influenced by previous labor market decision. 
The variables used for explaining the demand equations are the income variables. We 
have introduced total income variable as well as individual incomes, which in our case 
are pensions. In a second estimation, we have used a functional form for the demand 
equations that is quadratic in income, which means that there are some quadratic 
income variables as well. 
Since demands are determined by individual preferences which are not directly 
measurable, we have used some individual characteristics variables as proxies for 
preferences. We have introduced variables for both partners’ age. We have 
constructed age group categories, since we consider that persons which are at 
different stages in their lives might have different preferences. Another variable used 
is both persons’ education, in order to see whether persons with higher education 
have different preferences in comparison to persons with a lower level of education. 
We have introduced the number of children as well, since children are likely to have 
important impact on the demand equations. In order to capture the influence of 
tradition and customs, we have included regional variables and a variable for the rural 
households. The month of the interview is included as well in order to capture 
differences in consumption due to the seasonality of goods.  Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Another set of variables is introduced to capture the difference in patterns of 
consumption due to the difference in the accommodation conditions or the ownership 
of durables that households enjoy. Here we included dummies to account for 
accessibility to services, the existence of a fixed line phone, mobile phone, etc., the 
dimension of the living quarters, as well as the ownership of a car, computer, etc. 
In the end, we introduced variables to capture some specific situations, like self-
employment, self-employment in agriculture, presence of a loan, etc. Traditionally self-
employed persons tend to report own expenditure as business expenditure, therefore 
tend to underreport some types of expenditure like transport, telecommunication, 
utilities, etc. Self-employed in agriculture are producing a large share of the household 
food, so they are likely to show smaller than normal food expenditures.  
We have considered two functional forms for the demand equations, a linear one in 
incomes and a quadratic one in income: 
 C i = ai + bi Y + ci ym + di yf + e Z +ui        
 C i = ai + bi Y +(ci/2)Y
2+di ym+ (ei/2)ym
2+ fi yf +(gi/2) yf
2 +hi ym yf+ji Z+vi  (14) 
The outcome of the regression for linear functional form is presented in Table 1. There 
are no important differences between the outcomes in the case of linear functional 
form in comparison to the quadratic form. Next, we present some interesting 
information regarding the determinants of the demand functions: 
•  The age of the household head is important, especially for the services, transport 
and adult goods equation. Older household heads reduce services expenditure as 
well as adult goods expenditure. The spouse age increases service demands, but 
decreases adult goods demand. It appears that older household members have 
conflicting preference in terms of services and same preferences in terms of adult 
goods. 
•  The number of children influences especially the food expenditure. Each child 
increases it by more than 50 RON. Part of the increase in food comes at the 
expense of lower services expenditure in households with children. 
•  The education of the household head influences services, transport, adult goods. 
Higher education is associated with higher services expenditure, and lower 
transport and adult goods expenditure. The spouse education level influences 
services, adult goods and utilities expenditure. Services expenditure decreases 
with the education level of the wife, but both adult goods and utilities expenditure 
increases by as much as 100 RON for adult goods and 144 RON for utility 
expenditure. Again, we can notice the conflicting preferences of spouses in terms 
of service and adult good expenditure. It is interesting to compare the coefficients 
of spouses with higher education, the female university graduate coefficient is 
higher than the male’s (at all levels of education), suggesting that the educated 
females tend to have a stronger influence in the household consumption decision.  
  91
Table 1  
The determinants of household expenditure 














The age of the household head (the omitted category is age between 55-60) 
Age between 61-64  -4.89   4.62   -10.68 * 0.73  -4.61 * 3.64   -0.46  
Age above 65  -6.72   7.82   -14.62 ** 7.37 *** -5.00 *** 4.00   -0.60  
The age of the spouse (the omitted category is age between 55-60) 
Age between 61-64  1.82   -0.33   5.27  -2.69  -2.72 ** 1.92   0.86  
Age above 65  4.13   10.90   13.85 ** -2.57   -10.65 * -1.95   1.23  
Number of children 
1 child  56.75 * -13.52 *** -18.42 * -3.06   15.60 * 10.41 * -2.23 **
2 children  55.06 * 30.60 *** -30.24 ** 28.12 * 4.80  -7.60   0.29  
Education level of the household head (omitted category is no education) 
 - primary school (1 – 4)  -21.19   14.23  14.66   -12.21    -8.53 ** -6.08  -1.94  
 - secondary school (5 – 8)  -30.42   21.16  47.65   -27.67    -21.14 * -15.14  -3.91  
 - apprentice school  -26.41   28.88   68.64  -40.41 *** -29.59 *** -22.50   -5.41  
- high school  -24.67   36.22   105.61 *** -54.47 *** -34.69 *** -25.67   -8.80  
 - foreman qualification  -34.00   53.15   122.79 *** -73.37 *** -44.72 *** -28.40  -9.59  
 - short-term university  -43.38   65.49   152.06  -92.16 *** -65.02 *** -28.14  -13.34  
 - long-term university  -40.37   63.21   184.15  -107.54    -66.16  -32.12   -12.34  
Education level of the spouse (omitted category is no education) 
 - primary school (1 – 4)  -4.60   -25.15  -36.02 * 5.48   13.41 * 16.04 *** -0.07  
 - secondary school (5 – 8)  -19.59   -55.94  -79.23 * 13.06   30.98 * 39.04 *** -1.59  
 - apprentice school  -40.80   -77.54   -104.45 * 16.45   42.16 * 56.37 *** -2.62  
- high school  -41.95   -96.07   -140.06 * 20.87   53.73 * 80.11 *** -1.16   
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 - foreman qualification  -62.80   -121.52  -162.64 ** 24.06   67.19 * 90.14 *** 2.72  
 - short-term university  -86.16   -169.02  -233.97 * 19.76   96.88 * 104.78   -1.92  
 - long-term university  -100.67   -218.55  -258.72 ** 35.80    106.56 * 144.20 *** -1.73  
Total income  0.07 * 0.11   0.12 * 0.02  * 0.02 * 0.03 * 0.01 *
The pension of the household 
head 
0.27  -0.32   -1.01 *** 0.51  0.37 *** 0.27   0.06  
The pension of the spouse  0.52  0.97   1.11 ** -0.16    -0.53 * -0.65  0.03  
Occupational status of the household head 
 - pensioner  1.86   -9.21   5.09   -13.85 *** -9.31 *** -15.98   -4.01 ***
 - dependent  -18.70   11.93   -26.45  20.43    2.57   -5.93   0.27  
Occupational status of the spouse 
 - self-employed in agriculture -115.93   -233.86  -203.27   47.82   99.92 ** 139.22   -1.44  
 - member of an agricultural 
coop. 
-1.88  -357.66   176.55   47.42   119.23 ** 158.06   -5.94  
 - income support dependent  -106.76   -207.15  -181.40   49.37    100.67 ** 106.42   -1.11  
 - pensioner  -123.42   -259.92   -237.26 *** 53.72   119.87 * 163.94   -2.50  
 - dependent  -78.47   -5.33   -204.86 *** 34.78   103.67 * 128.13   -2.11  
Self-employed 21.81 * -15.94   -23.46 *** 1.81   13.95 * 1.70   -0.16  
Self-employed in agriculture  -31.74 * -0.48  -15.80 * -0.66  -1.96 ** -3.11 *** -1.95 *
Contracted a credit in the 
reference month 
0.04 * 0.09 * 0.04 * 0.02 * 0.01 * 0.01   0.00  
Interest payments  -0.06 * -0.12 * -0.05 * -0.03 * 0.00  -0.02 * 0.00 ***
Cash at the beginning of the 
month 
0.08 * 0.13 * 0.04 * 0.03 * 0.01 * 0.02 * 0.00 * 
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Acquisition of durables during 
the reference month 
0.00   0.91 * -0.07 * 0.02  -0.01  -0.06 * 0.01 ***
PC ownership  14.22   -14.78   -7.79  10.55  *** -14.27 * 27.24 * 5.07 *
Fixed line phone  4.44 ** 7.75 * -3.00  3.62  * 0.88  6.92 * 22.35 *
Mobile phone  16.12 * 26.55 * -5.68  10.56  * 10.71 * -7.96 ** 24.92 *
Car ownership  7.70 * -8.33 * -4.68  49.49  * 5.10 * 4.10 *** 1.58 *
The status of the accommodation (owner occupied is the omitted category) 
Rented from the state  -7.47   35.52  17.49   26.16  * 2.53   -8.20  -2.40  
Rented from owner  -21.60   57.08   5.60  -4.96  -0.55   4.45   2.12  
Does not pay rent  15.39   0.06   2.74  -0.71  -6.16  -6.72   0.32  
The surface of the living 
quarters 
-0.03  0.03   0.07  0.08  * 0.01  0.07 ** 0.02 *
Inside toilet  60.30   0.14   9.60   3.94   16.34  19.56   3.07  
Outside toilet  43.76   13.46   11.92  8.19    12.13   -15.40   1.15  
No toilet  35.80   13.77   12.02   7.72   13.96   -21.07   1.82  
Rural area  -5.98   30.57   13.03   20.15 * -6.22   -37.61 * 4.75 **
Constant 87.42   228.59  276.67 *** -128.62    -125.75 ** -82.57  -10.85  
Source: Household expenditure data and author’s computations. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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•  Having a self-employed person in the household helps in terms of reduced service 
expenditure and the increased adult goods expenditure. Thus, it seems that part of 
the service expenditure is deducted as part of own expenses by the self-employed. 
•  The self-employed in agriculture decreases the food expenditure by 30 RON. This 
does not mean that they consume less food, but rather that a large part is 
produced in the household. Since we have not imputed this production, the effect 
appears as decreased expenses on food.  
•  Households owning a personal computer have increased transport expenditure 
and utilities expenses, but reduced adult good expenses. It seems like having a 
computer is a substitute for tobacco and spirit consumption. The increased utility 
bill comes probably from the electricity consumption. 
•  The presence of a fixed line phone in the household is associated with larger food, 
non-food, transport, utilities and telecommunication expenditure. The increased 
telecommunications expenditure is not surprising, since this is where the phone bill 
enters, but it seems that only households that are spending more for given 
incomes are willing to enter into a fixed line contract. The same is true for the 
mobile phone, but the difference in expenses (for a given income) of households 
with mobile phone and the ones without it is even higher. 
•  Car ownership is associated with higher expenses on food, adult goods and 
utilities, and lower non-food expenses. The transport expenditure increases by 50 
RON due to the ownership of a car. 
•  The ownership of the accommodation is not very significant in terms of 
expenditure. But, once you have a house rented from the state, you are not willing 
to move so easily, so your transport expenses are increased, probably due to 
higher commuting expenses. 
•  The surface of the living quarters increases utilities expenditure, 
telecommunications and transport expenditure. The increase in utilities is not 
surprising since lighting, heating are in general proportional to the occupied space. 
Higher transport expenses for higher houses are a little surprising, but one needs 
to recall the fact that due to the cost of the land, higher houses are in general at the 
outskirts of urban areas. Moreover, the absence of utilities like natural gas, 
sewage, might increase costs for achieving a higher standard of living.  
•  Living in the rural area increases transport and telecommunication expenditure but 
decreases utilities expenses. The increased transport has to do probably with 
higher distances, as well as the absence of public transport. Decreased utilities 
expenses have to do probably with the absence of basic services in rural areas, 
and not with the reduced demand for services. 
Checking the income pooling hypothesis 
Our first goal is to test the income pooling hypothesis. As we have already explained, 
the presence of the individual incomes in the consumption equation cannot be 
explained by the common utility model. Therefore, if the coefficients of the individual  Forecasting the Romanian GDP 
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income are simultaneously different from zero in all seven demand equations we can 
interpret it as a proof that the data do not support the common utility model. 
The rejection of the common utility model is achieved whenever in equation (13) ci = di 
= 0 for all i, or, in equation (14) ci = di = ei = fi = gi = hi = 0 for all i. 
We applied the test to the models we run in the previous section. 
Table 2  
Income pooling test 
Linear functional forms: Ci = ai + bi Y + ci ym + di yf + e Z +ui  
Income pooling test ci = di = 0 
F(14,3908) 2.48 
Prob > F  0.0017 
Quadratic functional forms:  
Ci = ai + bi Y +(ci/2)Y
2+di ym+ (ei/2)ym
2+ fi yf +(gi/2) yf
2 +hi ym yf+ji Z+vi 
Income pooling test ci = di = ei = fi = gi = hi = 0 
F(35, 3908)  3.52 
Prob > F  0 
Source: Household expenditure survey and author’s computations. 
 
Table 2 presents the result of the income pooling test for the two functional forms. It is 
interesting to see that for both functional forms the income pooling hypothesis is 
rejected at 99% confidence intervals. The test is stronger for the quadratic functional 
form. The above results point towards the conclusion that the Romanian couples of 
pensioners do not behave according to ways which are compatible with the common 
utility model.  
Checking the implications of the collective model 
In this section, we are implementing the test obtained in section 0 on both the linear 
form of demand equations and on the quadratic form of the demand equations. All that 
is needed is to compute the ratio of the differences in derivatives of the household 
demand functions. 
For the linear demand functional form, equation (13), the derivatives are the following: 


























Introducing (15), (16) and (17) into (12) we end up with the following expression: Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Therefore, the test of the collective model in the case of linear functional form of the 
demand equations is a test of the equality of a ratio of two coefficients across all 
demand functions. The STATA software, which the author has used to estimate the 
demand equations, has a built-in test for the nonlinear restrictions, which simplifies a 
lot the implementation of the test.  
In the case of functional forms of the demands which are quadratic in incomes, 
equation (15), the derivatives are as follows: 
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Introducing (19), (20) and (21) into (12) we end up with the following expression: 
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Equation (22) can be rewritten as follows: 
 d i + ei ym + hi yf = λ(fi + gi yf +hi ym) (23) 
Both sides of the (23) equation are functions of ym and yf . In order for the equality to 
hold, we need the coefficients of the individual income as well as the constant to be 
equal on both sides of the equality sign. From a mathematical point of view, this 
means: 
 d i = λ fi ; ei ym = λ hi ym and hi yf = λ gi yf  


























= = = = = = ...  (24) 
Therefore, it can be noticed that the restrictions of the collective model over the 
demand functions can be written as equality of ratios of coefficients across all 
demands, similar to the linear functional form of demands. But in this case for each 
demand function there are three restrictions, in comparison to one in the linear case.  
  Forecasting the Romanian GDP 
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Table 3  
Testing the collective model 
Linear functional forms: Ci = ai + bi Y + ci ym + di yf + e Z +ui  
Testing the implications of the collective model ci /di = …= cj /dj  
F(6,3908) 0.38 
Prob > F  0.8946 
Quadratic functional forms:  
Ci = ai + bi Y +(ci/2)Y
2+di ym+ (ei/2)ym
2+ fi yf +(gi/2) yf
2 +hi ym yf+ji Z+vi 
Testing the implications of the collective model di /fi = ei /hi = hi /gi = …= dj /fj = ej 
/hj = hj /gj  
F(20, 3908)  0.46 
Prob > F  0.98 
Source: Household expenditure survey and author’s computations. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the tests of the collective model over the demand 
equations. The hypothesis that the restrictions of the collective model are holding 
could not be rejected for both functional forms. But what is more interesting is that in 
the case of quadratic functional form of demands, the implications are accepted at a 
5% level of significance. These tests are conclusive and there is strong evidence 
suggesting that the Romanian couples of pensioners are behaving in ways which are 
compatible with the collective model. 
Conclusions 
This paper aimed at answering questions related to the adequacy of the common 
utility model or the collective model in describing the Romanian household’s 
consumption behavior. In order to do this, I have employed two tests, the income 
pooling test, and a modified Browning test, which was derived in order to correct an 
assumption that I deemed unnecessary and unrealistic.  
The tests were applied to a database consisting of couples of pensioners obtained 
from the Household Expenditure Survey. I have limited the analysis to pensioners in 
order to avoid modeling the labor market decision which is simultaneous to the 
consumption decision. Both tests were applied to both linear and quadratic in income 
functional forms of the demand function. 
The income pooling test was rejected at high level of significance, which proved that 
the common utility model is not supported by the Romanian household data. However, 
the implications of the collective model, written in the form of the equality of the ratio of 
some coefficients, were very well supported by theory. The hypothesis could not be 
rejected, and in the case of the quadratic functional form the equality of the ratio of the 
coefficients is accepted at 98% confidence interval. We conclude that there is strong 
evidence suggesting that the Romanian couples of pensioners are behaving in ways 
which are compatible with the collective model. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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